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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Melvin Arthur McCabe appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction 
and order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. McCabe asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health 
evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's competency to represent 
himself. Additionally, Mr. McCabe asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In January of 2013, Jerome Police Officer Summers arrested Mr. McCabe for 
driving without privileges. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) p.4.)1 
Subsequently, Officer Summers located a cigarette pack on Mr. McCabe that contained 
a white crystal substance that was later identified as methamphetamine. (PSI, p.4.) 
Inside Mr. McCabe's vehicle, Officer Summers also discovered a glass pipe with 
residue, two digital scales, and a plastic tube. (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. McCabe was originally charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); one count of driving without 
privileges, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001; one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A; and one count of failure to 
provide proof of insurance (second offense), misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 49-
1232. (R., pp.67-69.) Additionally, the State sought a persistent violator enhancement, 
1 All page cites to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 38-page electronic document 
entitled "41357 State v. McCabe Confidential Exhibits." 
1 
under I §1 14, 
convictions. (R., pp.70-71.) 
on the fact 
the 
Mr. McCabe had four prior felony 
filed an Amended Information Part 2 
charging an enhancement, under I.C. § 37-2739, based on a prior misdemeanor 
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. (See R., pp.404-405.) That 
enhancement allowed the district court to impose a sentence that was twice the 
standard maximum for a possession of a controlled substance conviction. (See I.C. § 
37-2739; Tr. 5/13/13, p.12, Ls.5-10.) 
Counsel was appointed for Mr. McCabe, but Mr. McCabe subsequently filed a 
notice of appearance under Faretta v. California, 422 U 806 (1975), and requested 
that the district court allow him to represent himself. (R., pp.78-83.) After a hearing, 
the district court allowed Mr. McCabe to proceed prose. (R., p.106.) Mr. McCabe then 
filed a suppression motion that was denied by the district court. (R., pp.267-280, 304-
321.) Later, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. McCabe pleaded guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance and to the enhancement, under I .C. § 37-2739. 
(Tr. 5/13/13, p.8, Ls.2-8, 21-23, p.11, Ls.19-25.) In exchange, the State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining counts, as well as the persistent violator enhancement, and 
recommend a unified sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed. (Tr. 5/13/13, p.8, 
Ls.9-17.) 
At sentencing, the district court followed the State's recommendation and 
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed. (R., pp.431-437; Tr. 
7/12/13, p.18, Ls.13-15.) Mr. McCabe filed, prose, a Notice of Appeal that was timely 
from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.440-442.) 
Mr. McCabe subsequently filed, pro se, a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea under 
I.C.R. 33(c) (hereinafter, Rule 33(c)). (R., pp.477-483; see also affidavit in support of 
2 
motion, R., pp.488-491.) To substantiate the claims in that Rule 33(c), also filed a 
motion for a competency evaluation, and a motion for readings and hair follicle 
analysis to offer evidence that he was in a state of methamphetamine induced 
incompetence during the proceedings against him (R., pp.492-494; GPS motion -
augmented to the record on April 3, 2014.) In his motion for a competency evaluation, 
he said that he was under the influence of methamphetamine, which made him "unable 
to appreciate and understand the nature or consequences of waiving counsel or 
entering a plea of guilty to the crime charged." (R., pp.492-494.) 
In his Rule 33(c) motion and supporting affidavit, Mr. McCabe asserted, among 
other claims, that his use of methamphetamine "prevented him from having the mental 
necessary to be held responsible for a crime related to his drug addiction and/or 
have the prerequisite competency to waive the constitutional right to counsel or to assist 
and prepare a defense to the extent that a waiver of counsel would/could be held 
constitutionally valid."2 (R., pp.489-490.) He went on to say that the district court 
recognized this diminished capacity, and therefore should have sua sponte ordered a 
competency hearing to "determine the extent of defendant's mental disease or defect 
from toxic and lethal methamphetamine use or to determine if defendant was suffering 
from drug induced mental incompetence on a level that made him unable to understand 
the nature and/or consequences of a waiver of counsel or guilty plea." (R., p.490.) 
The district court denied Mr. McCabe's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (See 
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, I.C.R. 33(c) 
(hereinafter, Rule 33(c) Decision) - augmented to the record on April 3, 2014.) In 
2 Mr. McCabe made several other claims as part of his Rule 33(c) motion that are not 
being challenged on appeal. 
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Mr. McCabe's claim that he was under the influence of methamphetamine 
during proceedings, district court said that, based on hearing, it was 
"satisfied that the defendant made a valid waiver of counsel and that the waiver was not 
the result of being under the influence of controlled substances of any kind or any claim 
of diminished capacity." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.14.) Additionally, the district court said 
that, during the change of plea hearing, it asked if Mr. McCabe was under the influence 
of any drugs or alcohol, and Mr. McCabe said he was not. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.14.) 
Therefore, the district court found that the record proved that Mr. McCabe was not 
under the influence of drugs during the proceedings, and thus his plea was known, 
intelligent, and voluntary. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.15.) 
The district court also denied Mr. McCabe's motion for GPS readings and hair 
follicle analysis. It explained that the GPS readings would not produce any evidence of 
drug use because the ankle monitor he wore only tracked his location, not the ingestion 
of drugs. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.9.) In regards to the hair follicle analysis, it stated that 
it would be of no use to Mr. McCabe since hair follicle analysis does not indicate if the 
individual was using drugs at any particular time. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.9.) 
The district court denied Mr. McCabe's motion for a competency evaluation as 
well. (Rule 33(c) Decision, pp.7-8.) It stated that it was "at all relevant times familiar 
with defendant's substance abuse history, however, the court was also satisfied that his 
history of substance use did not impair his ability to understand the proceeding leading 
up to the entry of his Judgment of Conviction in this matter." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) 
It said that Mr. McCabe was incarcerated for approximately 45 days before his decision 
to represent himself, and it determined, as a result of the Faretta inquiry, that his 
decision was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) It said that 
4 
"[a]t no time did behavior, actions, conduct or writing's [sic] ever 
suggest to court that he did not understand the proceedings against him." (Rule 
33(c) Decision, p.8.) The district court also said that Mr. McCabe never raised the issue 
of his competency prior to his sentencing and "at no time did this court have any doubt 
as to the capacity of [sic} competency of the defendant to understand the nature and 
consequences of his plea." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a 
mental health evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's 
competency to represent himself? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c) 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed to Sua Sponte Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation And Make A Determination As To Mr. McCabe's Competency To 
Represent Himself 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McCabe asserts that there was substantial evidence that he was incompetent 
when he waived his right to counsel. Therefore, he contends that relief should be 
granted because the district court's failure to order a mental health evaluation to 
determine his competency to represent himself violated rights to due process, and 
his rights under I.C. §§ 18-210 18-211. 
B. Standard of Review 
When there is a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision not to order a 
mental health evaluation will not be upheld on appeal. State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 
77 4, 777 (2009). An appellate court reviews a district court's decision not to order a 
mental health evaluation for an abuse of discretion and examines "whether there was 
sufficient, competent, even if conflicting, evidence to support the district court's 
determination of competency." Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A 
Competency Hearing Because The District Court's Own Statements, And Those 
of Mr. McCabe. Demonstrated That Mr. McCabe Was Not Competent To 
Represent Himself 
Mr. McCabe asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to 
sua sponte order a mental health evaluation and make a determination as to 
Mr. McCabe's competency to represent himself, because there was sufficient evidence 
to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency. 
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A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent. v. Robinson, 
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). And "he may not waive his right to counsel or guilty 
unless he does so 'competently and intelligently,"' Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 
(1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938)). To guarantee such 
protection, Idaho Code§ 18-210 states that "[n]o person who as a result of a mental 
disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 
in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission 
of an offense so long as such incapacity endures." Further, I.C. § 18-211 states that 
[w]henever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed as 
set forth in 18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint least 
one ( 1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist or shall request the 
director of the department of health and welfare to designate at one 
(1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report 
upon the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense 
or understand the proceedings. 
Therefore, "a trial judge must conduct a competency hearing, regardless of whether one 
is requested, whenever the evidence before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about 
the defendant's competence to stand trial. A bona fide doubt exists if there is substantial 
evidence of incompetence." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567. 603-04 (9th Cir.2004)). However, because 
determinations of competency are inherently problematic, the Hawkins Court explained 
that "[aJn individual can have the capacity to understand the proceedings but lack a 
rational understanding, thereby resulting in incompetence." Id. A rational 
understanding was in turn defined as having "a sufficient contact with reality." Id. 
The Hawkins decision was prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's clarification of 
fundamental error in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). After Perry, this Court 
applies a three-part test to determine whether an error is fundamental: (1) whether the 
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alleged error violates an unwaived constitutional right; (2) whether the error is plain 
obvious from the record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision; and, (3) whether the defendant can establish that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 226. Here, the district court's failure to order a 
competency hearing sua sponte (or at least retroactively, as argued below) satisfies this 
test. First, Mr. McCabe never waived his right to due process at his Faretta hearing. 
Second, the error is clear from the record as described below. And finally, the error in 
this case affected the outcome of the proceedings because Mr. McCabe was left on his 
own to represent himself while he was incompetent. This was tantamount to a denial of 
counsel and ultimately led to Mr. McCabe to plead guilty. 
In Hawkins, the Court acknowledged that the defendant was capable of 
preparing and arguing his own defense, largely without the help of standby counsel." Id. 
at 779. The Court also noted that the defendant was "alert and coherent" during the 
pretrial and trial process and "filed numerous prose motions." Id. Indeed, Hawkins was 
even able to represent himself at trial with the help of standby counsel. Id. However, 
because of his strange behavior and "delusional characteristics during pretrial and trial," 
the Court said that the district court should have realized that Mr. Hawkins "might have 
been out of touch with reality and did not have a rational understanding of the 
proceedings." Id. Therefore, the Court held that the district court "should have 
entertained a reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either to stand trial 
or represent himself." Id. at 783. Thus, the Court found that the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation and make a 
competency determination, so it vacated Mr. Hawkins's judgment of conviction and 
remanded the case. Id. 
9 
Mr. McCabe's behavior leading up to and during his hearing, 
should have indicated to the Court that there was a reasonable doubt as to 
Mr. McCabe's ability to proceed prose. Indeed, the district court even stated that it was 
concerned about Mr. McCabe's ability to communicate. Similar to the situation in 
Hawkins, the district court noted that Mr. McCabe could write motions well but said that 
it was concerned because, based on its prior experience with Mr. McCabe, "[m]any 
times" Mr. McCabe's "comments seem disjointed, confused, not full sentences .... " (Tr. 
3/4/13, p.11, Ls.1-13.) Mr. McCabe actually demonstrated some of this behavior later in 
the Faretta hearing. When he was asked about whether his request to proceed prose 
had anything to do with his public defender, Mr. McCabe said that he thought she did a 
good job even though there was a disagreement in the beginning, but 
an odd, almost frenetic thought pattern when he said 
he exhibited 
I just - Just like I said before I've lost confidence in her, but it's not to say 
she's a bad attorney, you know. But, you know, and it's no reflection on 
her, but - You know, I know we're on record and I'm not going to put 
myself in a position to - well, I'm not going to appeal - You know what, 
Your Honor, push come to shove, I will not appeal my ineffectiveness. I 
won't. You know, I'll shove it down my own throat as far as admitting that 
I'm satisfied with her, because there is a lot to be said about that. 
(Tr. 3/4/13, p.14, Ls.8-20.) 
Additionally, the district court was obviously concerned when it noted that shortly 
before his request to proceed pro se, Mr. McCabe made strong claims that he actually 
did need a lawyer. The district court said "I believe when we were here a week or two 
ago, your indication was that you really needed a lawyer because you're facing the 
potential of life? (Tr., 3/4/13, p.9, Ls.23-25 - p.10, L.1.) In response, Mr. McCabe said 
"Yes, I - Yeah, I did relay that to the court." (Tr. 3/4/13, p.10, Ls.2-3.) The court then 
asked why his decision had changed. (Tr. 3/4/13, p.10, L.4.) Mr. McCabe said "Well, 
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Honor, I just I feel that I, you know, after reviewing the evidence stuff like 
as long as everybody plays aboveboard I feel that this thing could be resolved 
before trial. I really do." (Tr. 3/4/13, p.10, Ls.5-10.) 
Mr. McCabe's irrelevant and odd statements, his vacillations between coherent 
statements and confused ramblings, and his sudden shifts in strategy when facing such 
a long sentence should have indicated to the district court that Mr. McCabe did not have 
a sufficient contact with reality, and thus there was a reasonable doubt as to 
Mr. McCabe's competence. 
Nevertheless, the district court, in its memorandum decision on Mr. McCabe's 
Rule 33(c) motion addressed Mr. McCabe's claim that the court should have sua sponte 
ordered a competency evaluation and said it was "satisfied that the defendant made a 
valid waiver of counsel and that the waiver was not the result of being under the 
influence of controlled substances or any claim of diminished capacity." (Rule 33(c) 
Decision, p.14.) Additionally, it said that while it "was at all relevant times familiar with 
the defendant's substance abuse history" it was nonetheless "satisfied that his history of 
substance use did not impair his ability to understand the proceeding leading up to the 
entry of his Judgment of Conviction in this matter." (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) Also, it 
pointed out that Mr. McCabe was in the Jerome County Jail for "approximately 45 days" 
prior to his decision to represent himself. (Rule 33(c) Decision, p.8.) 
The district court's knowledge of Mr. McCabe's severe, long-term 
methamphetamine abuse offered more evidence that he was potentially not competent 
to represent himself. And, unfortunately, an extended period of time in a county jail, is 
not definitive proof that the defendant has not used drugs during that period; it is 
common knowledge that drugs are often available to incarcerated defendants. ( See 
11 
Washington Times, Drugs Inside Prison Walls, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 0/jan/27/drugs-inside-prison-walls/?page=all, 
(January 27, 2010). 
Mr. McCabe asserts that his actions and statements provided substantial 
evidence of incompetence. Therefore, the district court should have recognized that 
there was a bona fide doubt about his competence and sua sponte ordered a 
competency hearing prior to allowing him to proceed pro se. Therefore, the district 
court abused its discretion. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c) 
Motion To VVithdraw His Guilty Plea And His Accompanying Motion For a Retroactive 
Competency Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McCabe asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary because, due to his long-term use of methamphetamine, he was not 
competent when he pleaded guilty, and the district court's denial of his Rule 33(c) 
motion was premature because it failed to grant Mr. McCabe's motion for a retroactive 
competency determination. 
8. Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw 
a plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 765 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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Mr. McCabe's Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary Because, 
Due To His Methamphetamine Abuse, He Was Not Competent When He 
Pleaded Guilty 
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is 
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the 
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant 
to withdraw defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The Rule requires a higher standard of 
proof for post-sentence motions. See State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 571 (2011 ). "A 
showing of manifest injustice is necessary in order to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing." Id. 
"Because a guilty plea by a criminal defendant waives certain constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the 
right of confrontation, a guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record demonstrates 
that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Heredia, 
144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007). "Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver is not met." Id. 
A court determines whether a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly through a 
three-part inquiry involving: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty. 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). "On appeal, Idaho law requires that 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record 
as a whole." Id. 
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Mr. contends that that the injustice necessary to 
withdraw the plea his was not knowing or voluntary. His plea was 
not knowing or voluntary because, as a result of his long-term methamphetamine use, 
he was not competent when he pleaded guilty, and thus he did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his rights. Mr. McCabe asserts the district court prematurely denied 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because a retroactive competency evaluation 
would have proven that Mr. McCabe was not competent when he entered his plea. 
Mr. McCabe is indigent and had no means to pursue a retroactive competency 
evaluation. 
Further, as above, there was sufficient evidence to show that he was not 
competent when he waived his right to counsel. Given that the district court failed to 
sua sponte order a competency hearing at that time, the district court should not have 
denied Mr. McCabe's motion for a retroactive competency hearing. Because the entire 
record does not support the fact that Mr. McCabe waived his rights voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently, Mr. McCabe asserts that he has shown that manifest 
injustice occurred when the district court denied his motion for a retroactive competency 
evaluation and prematurely denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Even if this 
Court cannot say that he was incompetent, there is at least a question which warranted 
a retroactive competency evaluation. Thus, Mr. McCabe asserts the district court 
abused its discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. McCabe respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his judgment of conviction and remand the case for a competency determination. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the Rule33(c) order and remand the 
case for withdrawal of his guilty plea or, at a minimum, a competency determination. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2014. 
REED P. ANDERSON . 
Deputy State Appellate ~ublic Defender 
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